Capital Controls in Brazil: Stemming a Tide with a Signal? by Jinjarak, Yothin et al.
This article appeared in a journal published by Elsevier. The attached
copy is furnished to the author for internal non-commercial research
and education use, including for instruction at the authors institution
and sharing with colleagues.
Other uses, including reproduction and distribution, or selling or
licensing copies, or posting to personal, institutional or third party
websites are prohibited.
In most cases authors are permitted to post their version of the
article (e.g. in Word or Tex form) to their personal website or
institutional repository. Authors requiring further information
regarding Elsevier’s archiving and manuscript policies are
encouraged to visit:
http://www.elsevier.com/authorsrights
Author's personal copy
Capital controls in Brazil – Stemming a tide with a signal?
Yothin Jinjarak a,f, Ilan Noy b,c, Huanhuan Zheng d,e,⇑
aDeFiMS SOAS, University of London, United Kingdom
bUniversity of Hawaii, United States
cVictoria Business School, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand
d The University of York, United Kingdom
e Institute of Global Economics and Finance, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
fADB Institute, Tokyo, Japan
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 18 November 2012
Accepted 14 April 2013
Available online 1 May 2013
JEL classiﬁcation:
F32
G23
E60
Keywords:
Capital control
Brazil
Global ﬁnancial crisis
Mutual fund ﬂows
Exchange rate
a b s t r a c t
Controls on capital inﬂows have been experiencing a renaissance since 2008, with several prominent
emerging markets implementing them in recent years. We focus on Brazil, which instituted ﬁve changes
in its capital account regime in 2008–2011. Using the synthetic control method, we construct counterfac-
tuals (i.e., Brazil with no policy change) for each of these changes. We ﬁnd no evidence that any tighten-
ing of controls was effective in reducing the magnitudes of capital inﬂows, but we observe some modest
and short-lived success in preventing further declines in inﬂows when the capital controls were relaxed.
We hypothesize that price-based capital controls’ only perceptible effect is to be found in the content of
the signal they broadcast regarding the government’s larger intentions and sensibilities. In the case of
Brazil, its left-of-center government’s willingness to remove controls was perceived as a noteworthy indi-
cation that the government was not as hostile to the international ﬁnancial markets as many expected it
to be.
 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
‘‘What was just a trickle of controls before the current crisis is
now a ﬂood.’’
(Financial Times, October 25, 2010).
‘‘That option may not be available to . . . Brazil, where inﬂation
remains a problem. In their case, limited capital controls may
be a sensible short-term defence against destabilizing inﬂows
of hot money.’’
(The Economist, February 16, 2013).
1. Introduction
Controls on capital inﬂows have been experiencing a period
akin to a renaissance since the beginning of the global ﬁnancial
crisis in 2008. This renaissance has manifested itself most impor-
tantly in prominent cases of new controls being put in place; most
notably were Thailand, Korea, Peru, Indonesia, Brazil, and Iceland.1
In conjunction with this re-emergence of controls as an actual policy,
the theoretical literature has also shifted with now several contribu-
tions that explain the possible advantages of short-term controls
using theoretical models.2
Maybe the most pronounced shift has occurred at the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF has advocated the removal of
all controls on outﬂows and inﬂows throughout the 1990s.3 The
Asian Crisis of 1997–1998, however, initiated a very slow process of
conversion within the IMF that culminated recently with its decision
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1 The most basic distinction is between controls on outﬂows and inﬂows. The
economics literature consistently ﬁnds controls on outﬂows as inefﬁcient and
harmful. Binici et al. (2010) provide a recent empirical attempt to differentiate
between the impact of controls on outﬂows and inﬂows.
2 Jeanne (2012a), provides a selective summary of this new theoretical literature; a
more recent examination that looks at the impact of capital account policies on the
real exchange rate is available in Jeanne (2012b).
3 The IMF’s campaign to liberalize capital ﬂows culminated in an attempt to insert
this aim into its charter – see Joyce and Noy (2008) for details and empirical evidence.
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to explicitly and openly support the imposition of controls on capital
inﬂows.4 The basic premise of this new IMF stance on capital controls
is that these should be imposedwhen countries are facing a capital in-
ﬂow surge and after other policy alternatives have been exhausted.
Here, we are interested in examining whether capital controls
on inﬂows, imposed at the time of an inﬂow surge, are effective?
And if they are, what are their effects? We attempt to answer these
questions using the Brazilian experience of 2008–2011 in imposing
new (price-based) controls as the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) en-
folded. A prevailing view today is that controls should only be im-
posed in these kinds of crisis circumstances, rather than as
‘business-as-usual’ policies; and this position justiﬁes our choice
to focus on Brazil’s policy during the evolution of the GFC.5
There are broadly ﬁve possible impacts of capital controls on in-
ﬂows: (1) reduce the volume of capital inﬂows; (2) change the
composition of inﬂows (in accordance with the speciﬁc controls
imposed); (3) impact the real exchange rate (preventing an appre-
ciation); (4) enable a more independent pursuit of monetary policy
(as it relaxes the international trilemma’s constraints); and (5) in-
crease/decrease ﬁnancial stability.6 We are unable to directly deal
with the second impact (composition of ﬂows) given our data limi-
tations and choose not to examine the impact on ﬁnancial stability
since this is a longer-term impact, and our focus here is on the short
term (3 months). We thus focus on the volume of capital inﬂows, on
the exchange rate, and on domestic monetary policy (the interest
rate).
There are two recent survey papers on capital controls (Magud
et al., 2011; Ostry et al., 2012). Both ﬁnd that the empirical litera-
ture on the impacts of capital controls is inconclusive, with some
observed effects on the composition of ﬂows, but very little effect
on volumes of ﬂows (and even less agreement on the impact of
controls on the exchange rate and policy/interest rates).7
As Magud et al. (2011) point out, this evaluation of capital-con-
trols literature suffers from several apples-to-oranges problems.
Most relevant to our work are two problems: First, the literature
mostly ignores the heterogeneity of capital controls imposed
across countries and over time, and uses cross-country compari-
sons that utilize control indices that hide these distinctions (the
ones developed by Miniane (2004), Chinn and Ito (2006), and
Schindler (2009), are frequently used). Second, the case-studies lit-
erature focuses almost exclusively on the two poster-children of
capital controls, Malaysia (outﬂows) and Chile (inﬂows).8
Another distinction that appears important is the distinction
between short- and long-term impacts of capital account policies.
Long-term impacts, while potentially more important, are gener-
ally more difﬁcult to identify precisely, and this has certainly been
the case in this literature. Many of the papers that do ‘manage’ to
identify some precise impact of controls, do so only in the short-
term, and fail to ﬁnd any longer-term effects. The IMF, in its sup-
port for re-considering the use of capital control as a policy, argues
that their use should be temporary, and their aim is precisely to
have a short-term effect on the volume of capital inﬂows. We thus
focus here exclusively on the question of the short-term, and
ignore long-term effects, which are probably unidentiﬁable with
our methodology, even if they exist at all.
We focus on a set of controls imposed (and relaxed) by Brazil in
the last few years, in an attempt to control the amount of capital
ﬂowing into the country. By focusing on Brazil during the Global
Financial Crisis we directly examine the IMF’s support for imposi-
tion of controls in the face of capital inﬂow surges in a country that
has ﬁnancial markets that are largely open to capital ﬂows.
We use micro-level data on capital ﬂows from mutual funds
investing internationally, and a new methodology to estimate the
counter-factual (no imposition of controls). We use a methodolog-
ical innovation recently formalized in Abadie et al. (2010, hence-
forth ADH). The methodology is based on simulating conditions
after an exogenous event (in their case, a change in the tax rate,
in ours, the imposition or change in the rules governing capital in-
ﬂows). The synthetic counterfactual’s construction is based on the
relationship to a control group. The ADH algorithm does not pre-
sume to impose any ad hoc assumptions about the likely control
group, but rather derives this control group as a weighted average
of observations from all the non-treated units of observations with
weights estimated from pre-treatment data (in our case the non-
treated units are countries that have not changed their capital ac-
count policies during our sample). The ADH procedure allows us to
construct a no-policy-change counterfactual and thus measure in
detail the impact of the controls themselves. It further does not re-
quire us to make many structural assumptions that would have
been difﬁcult to theoretically justify.
To be thorough, we need to ﬁnd a way to examine all ﬁve pos-
sible impacts. We have weekly data on capital inﬂows frommutual
funds and examine the evolution of these inﬂows in the aftermath
of imposition of controls. Our data does not allow us to examine
the impact of controls on other types of ﬂows such as foreign direct
investment or bank loans, but the ﬂows we examine are relatively
representative.9 In addition to examining the impact on equity
ﬂows, we also look for any impact of the controls on exchange rate.
We use the same synthetic control methodology (Abadie et al., 2010)
in order to develop an alternative counter-factual exchange rate
without controls. Again, the ADH methodology allows us to skirt
the difﬁculty of wedding our analysis to any one exchange-rate-
determination model; since the literature on the determination of
exchange rates is both voluminous and contentious. We implement
the same methodology for interest rates, but since interest rate pol-
icy changed very little during this time period in Brazil, our model is
not good enough to capture accurately a synthetic control with a
good ﬁt for the ex ante data. Given that limitation, we do not present
our results regarding interest rates but rather brieﬂy describe them
at the end of the next section. We do not examine ﬁnancial stability
since our focus is the short-term (3 months) rather than the long-
term that is at the core of the ﬁnancial stability argument.
2. Capital controls and ﬂows in Brazil – the data details
2.1. The controls
Brazil liberalized its capital ﬂow regimes gradually starting
from the early 1990s, culminating in an almost completely open
capital account by the mid-2000s, including a ﬂexible exchange
rate regime (see Goldfajn and Minella, 2005; Carvalho and Garcia,
2008, for details and Baba and Kokenyne 2011, for an evaluation of
this capital account regime in the run-up to just before the global
ﬁnancial crisis). After a fairly brief period of no taxes on foreign
4 The most recent summary of this new IMF view is available in IMF (2012). Fig. 1
in Ostry et al. (2011) provides a parsimonious summary of the caveats and
preconditions that, according to the IMF, should accompany the imposition of
controls.
5 Klein (2012) employs a related distinction between controls as gates (temporary
and speciﬁc measures) and controls as walls (aiming to block most or all cross-border
capital transactions regularly).
6 The evidence on ﬁnancial stability in general, and in particular about the impact
of controls on the likelihood of ﬁnancial crises is quite mixed (see, for example, Glick
et al., 2006).
7 We do not provide a signiﬁcant review of this large literature since these two
recent surveys are available. An earlier survey of this literature is Edwards (1999).
8 Malaysia famously imposed temporary controls on capital outﬂows in the
aftermath of the Asian Crisis of 1997–1998, and this act generated a heated debate on
the topic. Chile imposed a set of taxes on short-term ﬂows in the 1990s that were
fairly widely perceived as successful in lengthening the maturity of ﬂows.
9 A comparison with capital ﬂow data from the IMF’s Balance of Payments Statistics
dataset is available in Appendix C.
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capital transactions, taxes were reintroduced in March 2008 at the
rate of 1.5% on ﬁxed-income investments.10 Investments related to
equities remained exempt from taxes for a while later.11 The tax was
reduced to zero in October 2008 at the peak of the global ﬁnancial
crisis, when the exchange rate came under depreciation pressures
(as in many other big emerging markets). A 2% tax on ﬁxed-income
and equity inﬂows was reintroduced in October 2009 with further
widening its application the next month. The tax was later increased
to 6% in two stages (in October 2010); but then reduced back down
to 2% in January 2011.12
2.2. The ﬂows
The weekly mutual fund ﬂows data we use are from Emerging
Portfolio Fund Research (EPFR) dataset. We calculate the weekly
ﬂows to a speciﬁc country as the aggregate ﬂows channeled specif-
ically to this country (from mutual funds whose focus is country-
speciﬁc). For robustness, we also calculate the broad regional ﬂows
to Latin America,which are the sumof all ﬂows channeled to this re-
gion including ﬂows that target a broader regional market, e.g. Latin
America, and evaluate its response to Brazilian capital control. We
use the weekly EPFR fund data, rather than the monthly measures
both because we are interested in the weekly dynamics following
policy treatment, andasweﬁnd that theseweekly funddata is better
correlatedwith the International Financial Statistics’ Balance of Pay-
ments portfolio data than the EPFR monthly aggregates.
In a similar manner, we calculate the Total Net Asset under
management (TNA) by summing up the TNA of all funds targeting
the designated country; and obtain the mutual fund return by tak-
ing the aggregated return of all funds that specialize in the desig-
nated country.
Other than the fund-speciﬁc characteristics, we also control for
the country’s stock and bond market performance as well as its for-
eignexchangerateﬂuctuations. Speciﬁcally,wecalculate theweekly
stock market return based on the national stock market index mea-
sured in local currency. Weekly bond market return is calculated
similarly. Bond indices are from JP Morgan GBI and EMBI and are
measured in local currency.Weekly return on foreign exchange rate
is calculated as the weekly return of the local currency against USD.
For every episode of capital control, we study 12 weeks
(approximately 1 quarter) before and after the control announce-
ment date. We include a country as a possible component of the
control group if (i) there are no capital controls of any kind im-
posed for the given sample period; and (ii) there are no missing
observations in either variables described above for the given sam-
ple period. Generally, only a few small countries drop out of the
sample. The ﬁnal control group sample contains 33–37 countries
depending on the episode.13 The list of countries used as controls
in each speciﬁcation is included in Appendix D.
One of the ADH algorithm’s advantages is the ability to use this
synthetic control methodology to estimate unbiased coefﬁcients
with relatively few pre-event observations. In our case we use 12
weekly observations pre-treatment for the estimation (see details
below); a similar number to what Abadie et al. (2010) use, and only
slightly less than the number used in the ﬁrst paper to employ this
methodology (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003). When we examine
the data for the control group of countries (those whose synthetic
weights are signiﬁcantly different from zero) and Brazil, we gener-
ally ﬁnd similar trends in the pre-treatment data, suggesting that
the shocks Brazil were experiencing were common and there is
no evidence to support the argument that the conditions leading
to the placing of controls were unique to Brazil. None of our control
countries had any change in its capital account policy imple-
mented in our sample periods.14
3. Methodology
Yit is the outcomevariable that is evaluatedbasedon the controls’
impact on the treated country i, (with i = 1 for Brazil and i > 1 for all
other countries) and time t (for time periods t = 1, . . . , T0, . . . , T;
where T0 = 13 is the time of imposition of controls or a change in
the control’s details) and T = 25. In this paper,we examine three out-
come variables – all three variables are potential policy aims, and all
may have been affected by the imposition or relaxation of capital
controls: aggregate capital ﬂows (as measured in our mutual fund
database), the exchange rate, and the interest rate.
YIit is the outcome variable in the presence of the controls and Y
N
it
is the outcome variable had the controls not been imposed.15 The
ADH methodology requires the assumption that the event has no ef-
fect on the outcome variable before the date of impact T0
ðYIit ¼ YNit8t < T0Þ. This assumption, in our context,means that the pol-
icy change was not anticipated. We present evidence to support this
assumption in Appendix B. The observed outcome is deﬁned by
Yit ¼ YNit þ aitDit where ait is the effect of the capital controls change
on the variable of interest ðYIit  YNit Þ and Dit is the binary indicator
denoting the event occurrence (Dit = 1 for tP T0 and i = 1; and
Dit = 0 otherwise). The aim is to estimate ait for all tP T0 for Brazil
(i = 1). The problem is that for all t P T0 it is not possible to observe
YN1t but only Y
I
1t .
Although there is no way of accurately predicting the country-
speciﬁc determinants of Yit, the structure of the emerging-market
economies in our sample is fairly similar and the external shocks
affecting them were fairly similar as well (except for mean zero
iid shocks eit). In this case, we suppose that YNit can be given by
the following factor model:
YNit ¼ dt þ htZi þ ktli þ eit ð1Þ
where Zi is a vector of observed covariates and li is a vector of un-
known factor loadings. Furthermore, we let W = (x2, . . . ,xI+1)0 be a
vector of weights allocated to the different country observations
such that xiP 0 for i = 2, . . . , I + 1 and
PIþ1
i¼2xi ¼ 1. The synthetic
control is a weighted combination of the controls observations such
that it replicates a treated unit as if the treatment had not occurred.
Suppose there is a set of optimal weights ðx^2; . . . ; x^Iþ1Þ that can
accurately replicate Brazil’s pre-treatment observations. Abadie
et al. (2010, Appendix B) show that with a few reasonable assump-
tions, YN1t ¼
PIþ1
i¼2x^iYit . Furthermore they prove that this equality
will hold for all t given that the number of pre-treatment periods
is large enough.16 Therefore we can use a^1t ¼ Y1t 
PIþ1
j¼2x^jYjt for
10 This tax, known as the IOF (imposto sobre operações ﬁnanceiras), has been used
during the 1990s as well.
11 In May 2008, the tax was extended to cover ‘‘simultaneous operations’’ to prevent
circumvention of the inﬂow tax (circumvention which was apparently widespread).
12 Tax was also expanded to cover margin calls on derivative positions and foreign
borrowing with maturities below 1 year. Our dating of these capital account policy
changes relies on OECD (2011), along with news readings from Reuters and Financial
Times.
13 In different contexts, Abadie et al. (2012) and Cavallo et al. (forthcoming) use
country-level panels (annual) with a synthetic control methodology. In the ﬁrst case,
to examine the impact of German re-uniﬁcation, in the latter to examine the
macroeconomic impact of natural catastrophes.
14 Some of the countries may have long-standing controls/regulations of various
types on the capital account. This is not likely to affect our results. Policy impact tends
to be short-term, as they are very likely to be arbitrage away, and in any case these
impacts, if they exist, should be consistent throughout the studied episodes. Thus, we
already adjust for these consistent impacts with our estimation methodology (that
only uses the pre-treatment sample separately for each episode.
15 This description is a modiﬁed version of Abadie et al. (2010). To simplify
comparison, we follow their notation where I denotes intervention (capital account
policy changed) and N denotes non-intervention (policy not changed).
16 See proof in Abadie et al. (2010) Appendix B. Other recent papers that used the
Abadie et al. (2010) methodology, albeit in very different contexts, are Nannicini and
Billmeier (2011), Pinotti (2011), Abadie et al. (2012), Hinrichs (2012), Cavallo et al.
(forthcoming), and duPont and Noy (2012).
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tP T0 as an estimator for a1,t provided we choose a set of weights,
W.
We deﬁne X1 ¼ ðZ01;YK11 ; . . . ;YKM1 Þ a vector of pre-intervention
characteristics of Brazil’s capital ﬂow regime, and similarly X0 for
the control countries. The set of weightsW is obtained by minimiz-
ing the distance between the observations of the treated unit X1
and the observations for the group of control X0W during the
pre-treatment period. We choose W such that the following equa-
tion is minimized:
X1k  X0WkV ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ðX1  X0WÞ0VðX1  X0WÞ
q
ð2Þ
where V is a (k  k) symmetric and positive semi-deﬁnite matrix (k
is the number of explanatory variables). The choice of V is important
as it can greatly impact the mean square prediction error. We use
the STATA synth routine to obtain V such that the mean squared
prediction error is minimized for the period prior to the policy
change.17
The estimates of Eq. (1) are only used for constructing the coun-
terfactual as accurately as possible. Thus, we are not interested in
the actual coefﬁcient estimates of these regressions as they have
no economic signiﬁcance or otherwise interpretable meaning.18
The usual statistical signiﬁcance of our reported results, based
on regression-based standard errors, is not relevant in this case
since the uncertainty regarding the estimate of a^it does not come
from uncertainty about the aggregate data. Uncertainty in compar-
ative case studies with synthetic control is derived from uncer-
tainty regarding the ability of the post-treatment synthetic
control to replicate the counterfactual post-treatment in the trea-
ted observations.
Following Abadie et al. (2010), we use permutation tests to
examine the statistical signiﬁcance of our results: We separately
assume that every other country in our control sample implements
a similar (and imaginary) capital control in the same year. We then
produce counterfactual synthetic control for each ‘‘placebo con-
trol.’’ These synthetic counterfactuals for the placebos are then
used to calculate the impact of the placebo capital controls (a^Pit)
in every year following its (non)-occurrence with the following
formula:
a^Pit ¼ YIit  Y^Nit ¼ YIit  d^þ
XJ
j¼2
x^jYNjt
" #
for t P T0 and j – P ð3Þ
Essentially, we investigate whether the a^1t we estimated for Brazil
are statistically different from the placebo a^Pit for i > 1. We present
the placebo results only for episodes in which we ﬁnd any visible
impact of the change in the capital control regime.
4. Results
4.1. Results for capital inﬂows and exchange rate
We graph the actual evolution of capital inﬂows (as recorded in
the EPFR data we use) and the synthetic control that assumes no
change in policy. These ﬁgures therefore show the counter-factual
evolution of capital ﬂows had the changes in capital account policy
not occurred. We summarize these results chronologically for each
change in Brazil’s capital account policies 2008–2011:
The ﬁrst act – March 2008 (taxing ﬁxed income only) – is re-
ported in Fig. 1. We observe a decline in ﬂows in the run-up to
the placing of controls, but that funds start ﬂowing in again (net)
about 2 weeks before the episode; this budding inﬂow may be
the impetus for the placing of controls (Fig. 1A). The placing of con-
trols did not appear to have a large inﬂuence. There was a small
and temporary slowdown in the inﬂow episode that resulted from
the controls. While we observe a continuation of the inﬂow for the
counter-factual scenario, Brazil experienced a similar dramatic
rise, but with about a month’s delay. We are not conﬁdent that this
delay, however, is a result of the imposed controls since it is also
present in inﬂows to other Latin American destinations that did
not put any controls in place.19 A similarly very brief deviation from
the counter-factual can be also observed for the exchange rate
(Fig. 1B). Within 3–4 weeks, we can no longer identify any residual
impact of the imposition of controls on the exchange rate.
In Fig. 2, we report on the second act – October 2008 (removing
the ﬁxed-income tax during the Lehman aftermath). Inﬂows were
decreasing rapidly throughout the pre-crisis period starting in July,
2008 (Fig. 2A). We observe evidence of a slowdown in the capital
outﬂows as a result of this removal of controls in October. The coun-
ter-factual Brazil (without the relaxation of controls) would have
experienced a continuing capital ﬂight. Latin America funds (La-
tAm), also seem to continue declining during this period, though
at a slowing rate, which suggests that the removal of the IOF did in-
deed have the intended effect. In Fig. 2B we present the placebo test
for this episode; the evidence only suggests an impact that is statis-
tically observable as non-coincidental (i.e., the gap between the Bra-
zilian ﬂows and the counter-factual is bigger than for themajority of
the placebos). The evidence regarding the exchange rate is not as ro-
bust (Fig. 2C), but there still does appear to be a longer-term impact
on the exchange rate than the one we observed in the ﬁrst episode.
Even that, however, appeared to be a transitory phenomenon.
Third act – October 2009 (taxing both equity and bonds at 2%):
The policy aim was to reduce inﬂows, and that did not seem to
work (Fig. 3A). Brazil continued experiencing inﬂows as did the
rest of LatAm (if anything, the inﬂows for Brazil are rising faster
than for other Latin American funds).20 We ﬁnd no evidence that
the imposition of controls had any impact of the exchange rate
(Fig. 3B).
Fourth act – October 2010 (tax going up to 4% on ﬁxed income):
In Fig. 4A, we again observe an ineffective control as increase in the
IOF does not interrupt the continuing inﬂow episode (as it did for
other LatAm countries; but with a bigger impact for Brazil). In both
acts Three and Four of 2009 and 2010, the post-control inﬂow
boom episodes seem to be large and unique (since the actual is sig-
niﬁcantly larger than the synthetic and unique to Brazil relative to
LatAm funds). The controls did not manage to stem the volume of
these inﬂows, though they may have produced other desirable out-
comes (more on that below). In the next change in policy, pre-
sented in Fig. 4B, the IOF was further increased to 6% only
2 weeks after the previous increase (October 2010). Again, the
further tightening of controls appears ineffective in stemming in-
ﬂows. We do not show the corresponding ﬁgures for the exchange
rate, but the results are similarly non-signiﬁcant.21
Fifth act – January 2011 (reducing taxes on equities). In Fig. 5A,
we observe a short-run surge in equity investment that is unique
to the Brazil funds and may be attributable to the reduction in
the tax on equities. But this surge reverses quickly; and post-rever-
17 The STATA program is described at: http://www.mit.edu/~jhainm/
synthpage.html.
18 Results for the synthetic weights we obtain are available in Appendix A. When we
examine the data for the control group of countries (those whose weights are
different from zero) and Brazil, we generally ﬁnd similar trends in the pre-events
data, suggesting that the shocks Brazil were experiencing were common and there is
no evidence to support the argument that the conditions leading to the placing of
controls were unique to Brazil. These ﬁgures are available upon request.
19 These results for the Latin American funds are not presented in the ﬁgures but are
available upon request.
20 If anything, inﬂows increased further after the tightening of controls. Since the
controls were imposed as a capital inﬂow surge was beginning, it is difﬁcult to
speculate whether the controls were somehow a signal that encouraged further ﬂows
(a possibility that is suggested in the survey data that Forbes et al., 2012 present).
21 Results are available upon request from the corresponding author.
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sal decline is equivalent to a general decline in funds going to La-
tAm in the ﬁrst 3 months of 2011. This conclusion is borne out
when examining the placebos graphed in Fig. 5B; again, we sur-
mise that a relaxation of controls did appear to have a very short
term, but both statistically and economically meaningful impact
on capital ﬂows. In the longer-term (3 months in our framework)
there does not seem to be any signiﬁcant impact. The same ﬁnd-
ings, a brief deviation from the counter-factual and a reversion
back to the pre-change equilibrium can also be found in the esti-
mations of the exchange rate (Fig. 5C).
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Fig. 1A. 2008-3-12 Taxing ﬁxed income investment – CAPITAL FLOWS.
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Fig. 1B. 2008-3-12 Taxing ﬁxed income investment – EXCHANGE RATE.
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Fig. 2A. 2008-10-23 Cutting ﬁxed income tax – CAPITAL FLOWS.
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4.2. Summary of empirical ﬁndings – capital controls as a signal
To summarize, after controlling for the counter-factual (Brazil
with no capital account policy change) for each event in which
Brazil modiﬁed its capital controls during the ﬁrst 3 years of the
Global Financial Crisis, we ﬁnd no evidence that any tightening
of controls were effective in reducing the magnitudes of capital in-
ﬂows into the country. We do observe some modest success in pre-
venting further declines in inﬂows when the capital controls are
relaxed as was done in the immediate aftermath of the Lehman
Fig. 2B. 2008-10-23 Cutting ﬁxed income tax – Placebos.
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Fig. 2C. 2008-10-23 Cutting ﬁxed income tax – EXCHANGE RATE.
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Fig. 3A. 2009-10-20 Taxing stock and bond investment at 2% – CAPITAL FLOWS.
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bankruptcy in 2008 and the associated massive credit contraction
worldwide. A similar modest success can be attributed to the deci-
sion by the Brazilian government to reduce taxes in January 2011.
Both of these decisions to relax controls were instituted during a
capital outﬂow episode, and these successes were more evident in
preventing further decreases in capital inﬂows than in any sustained
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Fig. 3B. 2009-10-20 Taxing stock and bond investment at 2% – EXCHANGE RATE.
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Fig. 4A. 2010-10-4 Increasing taxes 2–4% – CAPITAL FLOWS.
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Fig. 4B. 2010-10-18 Increasing taxes 4–6% – EXCHANGE RATE (and increasing taxes on margins from 0.38% to 6%). Note: The sample period overlap with the last synthetic
analysis. The large gap several weeks before the capital control may be attributed to previous control.
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impact on the exchange rate. These results complement survey re-
sponsesdescribed inForbeset al. (2012). In these surveysof investment
managers, the overall conclusion Forbes et al. (2012) reach is that
investment managers’ reactions to fairly limited capital account policy
changes in a large open economy like Brazil is verymuted and remark-
ably heterogeneous. Given these heterogeneous sentiments it may not
beasurprise thatweﬁnd so little impact that canbeaccounted for by
the tightening of the capital account regime.
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Fig. 5A. 2011-1-3 Reducing taxes from 6% to 2% – CAPITAL FLOWS.
Fig. 5B. 2011-1-3 Reducing taxes from 6% to 2% – Placebos.
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Fig. 5C. 2011-1-3 Reducing taxes from 6% to 2% – EXCHANGE RATE.
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Another possibility is that the controls did have a portfolio bal-
ancing impact even if indeed they had no impact on funds’ size,
since the households and corporations and other entities that in-
vest in funds did not react to the imposition of controls. It may still
be the case that fund managers did divert money from Brazil to
other countries within the funds they manage. Given the data lim-
itations, we cannot test this possibility.
Why did we ﬁnd an asymmetric impact? Why is there a signif-
icant impact when controls were removed? The interviews that
were conducted by Forbes et al. (2012) suggest that many money
managers were more interested in the signal content of the capital
account policy change rather than in the direct impact of the
changes on their tax liability and therefore on their bottom lines.
Brazil, throughout this period, was controlled by the left-of-center
Workers’ Party headed by Lula.22 Our hypothesis is that price-based,
mild capital controls’ only perceptible effect are to be found in the
content of the signal they broadcast regarding the government’s lar-
ger intentions and sensibilities. In Lula’s case, the government was
widely perceived as ambivalent to markets, and especially to the
international capital markets. Thus, an imposition of (fairly mild)
controls was not perceived as ‘news’ and thus had no impact. A will-
ingness to remove controls, however, as happened in October 2008
in the middle of the global post-Lehman ﬁnancial panic and then
again in January 2011, just after the transition from Lula to Dilma
Rousseff’s administration were both apparently perceived as note-
worthy indications that the government was not as hostile to the
international ﬁnancial markets as many expected it to be. The re-
moval of controls was thus effective since the presumption was that
the government had some antipathy to ﬁnancial markets and foreign
investors. This of course, suggests that the same policy may have a
different impact within a political environment in which the govern-
ment is perceived differently.
4.3. Brazil and the BRIC
The weights we obtained in constructing our synthetic con-
trols (see Appendix D) have no real economic meaning, but do de-
scribe the conditional correlation between ﬂows to Brazil and
ﬂows to the other countries in our sample. Interestingly, the other
BRIC countries (Russia, India and China) seem to ﬁgure quite
prominently as controls (with the occasional addition of Mexico,
Australia, Indonesia, Taiwan). This is interesting in and of itself,
since Russia and Brazil are large commodity exporters, and India
and China’s sectoral composition of trade is quite different.
Investment managers of the funds included in the dataset seem
to treat the BRIC as similar substitutes and capital inﬂows to
them appear to be motivated similarly. Capital ﬂows in Brazil
are correlated much more closely with the other members of
the BRIC club rather than with regional neighbors like Argentina
or Chile, and other large agricultural exporters like Colombia or
Thailand.
Forbes et al. (2012) focus on the externalities created by the
imposition of capital controls, and how the imposition/relaxation
of controls in one country (Brazil) may lead to reallocation of port-
folio shares that may have an impact on other countries’ capital
ﬂows. We therefore estimate the impact of Brazil’s ﬁve episodes
of change in its capital account regime on the other BRIC club
members, Russia, India and China. In most cases, we do not observe
any statistically visible deviation between the synthetic and the ac-
tual ﬂows – so that Brazil’s policy changes had no apparent impact.
In a few instances, however, there do seem to be notable devia-
tions; in particular we observe that for China in the ﬁrst episode
(an inﬂow surge), Russia in the second episode (outﬂow), China
again in the third episode (again an inﬂow surge), and India and
China in the ﬁfth episode (outﬂow). But these deviations ﬁt with
our notion that Brazil is attempting to ‘lean-against-the-wind’
while the other BRIC are facing the same head- or tail-winds them-
selves. Unlike Forbes et al. (2012), we are hesitant to conclude that
this is a sign of an externality; it is equally plausible that these
changes in controls were implemented when all the BRIC were
experiencing very similar capital inﬂow surges or capital ﬂights/
retrenchments.
5. Caveats and future research
In an IMF April 2011 meeting discussing the IMF’s guidelines for
supporting the use of capital controls, the Brazilian Finance Minis-
ter Guido Mantega voiced his opposition. He declared: ‘‘We oppose
any guidelines, frameworks or ‘codes of conduct’ that attempt to
constrain, directly or indirectly, policy responses of countries fac-
ing surges in volatile capital inﬂows. Governments must have ﬂex-
ibility and discretion to adopt policies that they consider
appropriate.’’ (Reddy, 2011). The Brazilian government, as well as
other representatives from emerging markets, found the IMF’s lim-
ited support of capital controls as a prudential policy tool as too
limited and constraining, and argued for a broader mandate to
use this set of tools.
In what can be perceived as a limited conﬁrmation of this con-
cern, IMF researchers recently concluded, in the case of several
Eastern European countries that were experiencing heavy inﬂows,
that the conditions prevailing in these cases did not justify the
imposition of controls; and advocated more conventional mone-
tary and ﬁscal adjustments (Chowdhury and Keller, 2012). If one
uses the broad framework that the IMF suggests, however, on most
accounts Brazil in 2008–2010 appeared to have been a good candi-
date for the imposition of controls.
It is remarkable, therefore, that we fail to ﬁnd much impact of
these controls given their intended rationale in limiting the vol-
ume of capital ﬂowing into a potentially over-heated economy,
and the vocal support these policies have garnered from many
corners of the policy world. These ﬁndings suggest that mild
price-based controls appear effective only if they are surprising
and provide a signal regarding the government’s larger policy tra-
jectory. Clearly, using controls as a signal is both costly, inefﬁ-
cient, and can only be used infrequently. A sceptical reader
may, of course, suggest that our results may not be robust and
our failure to uncover the direct impacts of controls (bar their sig-
nalling impact) is a failure of our methodology. While this is a
possibility, a spate of other recent work has also failed to ﬁnd
much evidence for a signiﬁcant impact of ‘mild’ controls, or is
generally sceptical of any claims of the efﬁcacy of these con-
trol—such as these that were implemented in the Brazilian case
(e.g., Calvo, 2010; Warnock, 2011; Edwards, 2012; Fratzscher,
2012; Straetmans et al., 2013; Chari, 2013).
An additional possibility is that the Brazilian case is not repre-
sentative and any conclusions will not be applicable elsewhere.
This is a general criticism of any case-study, and applicability of
a case is never assured; again, we argue that given the prevalence
of similar conclusions in this recent spate of cross-country research
projects, we believe the Brazilian case is most likely representative
of the larger truth: ‘mild’ capital controls are largely ineffective un-
less they provide a signal regarding the general trajectory of gov-
ernment economic policy (‘draconian’ controls are, by deﬁnition,
effective).
The reasons for instituting these policies, of course, may be
political and electoral in nature, rather than being truly guided
by a desire to obtain any of the impacts we described. It may be
indeed that policy makers fully understand the inability of these
22 Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Replaced on 1/1/2011 by Dilma Rousseff from the same
left-of-center political party.
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controls to have any substantial impact, but nevertheless resort to
adopting them. We leave that possibility for future work.
Appendix A. Estimation results for synthetic analysis in Figs. 1–5
The following set of tables in Appendix A compares the pre-
treatment characteristics of the treated (actual) Brazil with that
of the synthetic Brazil. The synthetic Brazil is constructed as
the combination of countries chosen from the sample that most
closely resembled Brazil in term of capital ﬂows before Brazil
introduced the capital account policy change speciﬁed in the ti-
tle of each table (and the date it was implemented). See
Appendix C for a full list of countries and their synthetic
weights used to construct the synthetic observation. The re-
ported statistics are the mean values of the actual and syn-
thetic explanatory variables for the pre-treatment periods,
which are 12 weeks prior to the week of policy change. Root
Mean Squared Prediction Error (RMSPE) is calculated as the
root mean of the weighted squared distance between the trea-
ted and synthetic capital ﬂows for the pre-treatment periods
(see Tables A1–A5).
Appendix B. Were Brazilian capital controls anticipated?
In this appendix, we examine an empirical association be-
tween the announcements of capital control measures and any
potential market and public anticipation of these announce-
ments. We aim to verify that the timing of announcements used
in the main study is indeed a surprise (regardless of its news
content and economic signiﬁcance) and therefore cannot be fore-
casted quantitatively by capital market indicators and surveys.
While our main ﬁndings in Sections 2–4 are based on ﬁve major
announcements from 2008 to 2011 as we were constrained by
the weekly fund ﬂows data, this appendix reports several tests
over the whole post GFC sample period 2008–2012, and also
provides a description of all announcements of control measures,
as brieﬂy outlined in the following.
The IOF that was initially imposed on foreign investors’ bond
investment was announced on 12 March 2008. On 23 October
2008, the government announced the elimination of the ﬁnancial
transaction tax on foreign investors, which at the time stood at
1.5% on foreign exchange transactions for capital inﬂows and
0.38% on foreign currency loans. By mid October 2009, the Reais
again appreciated markedly and the IOF was re-imposed on 20
October 2009. In September 2010, the Reais appreciation in-
creased markedly again, and on October 4, 2010, the government
announced an immediate increase of IOF tax on bond from 2% to
4%. Then, on 18 October 2010, the government announced addi-
tional IOF tax increase from 4% to 6%. By early December 2010,
the market still speculated that the IOF tax might be raised
further from 6% on the bond investment, but remained 2% on
the equity investment (since speculation in the stock market
did not seem to pose much threat). On 3 January 2011, the
government announced a reduction on the IOF tax on private
equity funds, venture capital funds, and depository receipts from
6% to 2%. By mid 2011, as the appreciation of Reais regained its
momentum, the government announced a tax on trading of
Table A1
Estimation results: 2008-3-12 taxing ﬁxed income investment.
Variables Treated Synthetic
Cumulative ﬂow on the week end at 2008-2-6 712.080 724.852
Cumulative ﬂow on the week end at 2008-2-27 816.750 817.039
Mutual fund return 6.086 1.972
log(TNA) 9.464 8.863
Weekly return on stock market index 1.904 0.473
Weekly return on bond market index 1.898 1.812
Weekly return on foreign exchange rate 5.704 3.991
RMSPE (Root Mean Squared Prediction Error) 53.084
Table A2
Estimation results: 2008-10-23 cutting ﬁxed income tax.
Variables Treated Synthetic
Cumulative ﬂow on the week end at 2008-9-24 370.620 386.686
Cumulative ﬂow on the week end at 2008-10-8 557.050 524.667
Mutual fund return 54.740 42.002
log(TNA) 9.225 8.689
Weekly return on stock market index 36.250 35.266
Weekly return on bond market index 2.084 0.219
Weekly return on foreign exchange rate 21.446 9.756
RMSPE (Root Mean Squared Prediction Error) 36.664
Table A3
Estimation results: 2009-10-20 taxing stock and bond investment at 2%.
Variables Treated Synthetic
Cumulative ﬂow on the week end at 2009-8-5 197.340 199.387
Cumulative ﬂow on the week end at 2009-8-12 265.390 266.513
Mutual fund return 26.661 25.029
log(TNA) 9.609 8.558
Weekly return on stock market index 18.949 23.702
Weekly return on bond market index 1.358 2.574
Weekly return on foreign exchange rate 8.262 5.382
RMSPE (Root Mean Squared Prediction Error) 101.242
Table A.4A
Estimation results: 2010-10-4 increasing taxes 2–4%.
Variables Treated Synthetic
Cumulative ﬂow on the week end at 2010-8-25 480.330 480.233
Cumulative ﬂow on the week end at 2010-9-1 587.620 587.774
Mutual fund return 10.150 10.112
log(TNA) 9.921 9.869
Weekly return on stock market index 7.818 7.779
Weekly return on bond market index 1.632 1.293
Weekly return on foreign exchange rate 3.482 3.825
RMSPE (Root Mean Squared Prediction Error) 70.546
Table A.4B
Estimation results: 2010-10-18 increasing taxes 4–6%.
Variables Treated Synthetic
Cumulative ﬂow on the week end at 2010-9-25 606.060 874.442
Cumulative ﬂow on the week end at 2010-10-13 2074.290 1536.694
Mutual fund return 14.347 11.746
log(TNA) 9.964 10.615
Weekly return on stock market index 9.170 10.649
Weekly return on bond market index 1.536 0.365
Weekly return on foreign exchange rate 5.048 1.718
RMSPE (Root Mean Squared Prediction Error) 307.223
Table A5
Estimation results: 2011-1-3 reducing taxes from 6% to 2%.
Variables Treated Synthetic
Cumulative ﬂow on the week end at 2010-11-3 844.590 607.302
Cumulative ﬂow on the week end at 2010-11-29 688.920 851.904
Mutual fund return 0.064 3.382
log(TNA) 10.115 9.082
Weekly return on stock market index 1.809 5.026
Weekly return on bond market index 1.352 1.873
Weekly return on foreign exchange rate 0.657 2.985
RMSPE (Root Mean Squared Prediction Error) 206.968
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currency derivatives on 27 July 2011, and then outlined its de-
tailed plan on 16 September 2011 for a 1% tax on currency
derivatives, but on 23 September 2011 decided to delay the
tax until the end of December. As the threat of Euro crisis
mounted over the global markets, the government announced
on 1 December 2011 that the IOF tax on equity investment
and corporate bond investment was immediately scrapped. By
early March 2012, however, the Reais’ appreciation renewed
03jan2011
23sep2011
01dec2011
23m
ay2012
14jun2012
20
oc
t20
09
04
oc
t20
10
18
oc
t20
10
27
jul
20
11
16
se
p2
01
1
01
ma
r20
12
1.
6
1.
8
2
2.
2
2.
4
R
ea
is
/U
S$
03jan2011
23sep2011
01dec2011
23m
ay2012
14jun2012
20
oc
t20
09
04
oc
t20
10
18
oc
t20
10
27
jul
20
11
16
se
p2
01
1
01
ma
r20
12
7
8
9
10
11
12
Se
lic
03jan2011
23sep2011
01dec2011
23m
ay2012
14jun2012
20
oc
t20
09
04
oc
t20
10
18
oc
t20
10
27
jul
20
11
16
se
p2
01
1
01
ma
r20
12
0
1
2
3
4
5
In
te
rv
en
tio
ns
, C
en
tra
l B
an
k,
 S
po
t
03jan2011
23sep2011
01dec2011
23m
ay2012
14jun2012
20
oc
t20
09
04
oc
t20
10
18
oc
t20
10
27
jul
20
11
16
se
p2
01
1
01
ma
r20
12
−4
−2
0
2
4
6
FX
 T
ra
ns
ac
tio
ns
, F
in
an
ci
al
 S
ec
to
r
Fig. B1. Announcements of capital control measures and capital market indicators. This ﬁgure plots the daily series of business surveys of expectation on Reais/US$ and
expectation on Selic rates, as well as the spot foreign exchange invention by Banco Central do Brasil (in billion of US$) and the net (purchases minus sales) foreign exchange
transactions by ﬁnancial sectors in Brazil (in billion of US$). The drop lines in solid identify announcement dates of capital control tightening (increase); the drop lines in dash
identify announcement dates of capital control loosening (decrease).
Table B1
Anticipation of the Announcements of capital control measures.
Capital control Probit Bivariate Probit
(1) (2) (3)
Increase Decrease Increase Decrease
Surveyed var. Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
Reais/US$t 3.90 (3.17) 31.01 (13.18)** 27.01 (38.70)
Selict 2.70 (2.19) 1.94 (1.32) 6.87 (5.33) 0.82 (6.70)
Interventiont 0.53 (0.26)** 0.63 (1.17) 1.72 (3.86)
FX Gross Flowst 0.20 (0.16) 0.19 (0.30) 0.20 (0.45) 0.21 (0.53)
Reais/US$t1 1.66 (9.19) 7.57 (4.78)
Reais/US$t2 0.55 (6.16) 9.00 (5.69)
Reais/US$t3 1.94 (5.03) 0.92 (4.77)
Selict1 0.86 (0.91)
Selict2 2.02 (3.72)
Selict3 12.26 (14.48)
Interventiont1 0.08 (0.49) 0.38 (0.50)
Interventiont2 0.34 (0.52) 0.24 (0.46)
Interventiont3 0.26 (0.68) 0.76 (0.71)
FX Gross Flowst1 19.32 (58.91)
FX Gross Flowst2 70.46 (69.06)
FX Gross Flowst3 5.84 (47.87)
Constant term 2.70 (0.17)*** 2.58 (0.18)*** 2.64 (0.42)*** 3.15 (0.59)***
No. of days 979 979 391
Pseudo R2 0.0825 0.0560 Prob. > chi2 = 0.9937
This table reports an empirical association between the announcements of capital control measures and any potential market and public anticipation. The estimation is based
on 11 (out of 13) announcement dates from 2008 to 2012 as discussed in the Appendix. The daily series, collected from DataStream, are available from 4 May 2009, and
include business surveys of expectation on Reais/US$ and expectation on Selic rates, as well as the spot foreign exchange invention by Banco Central do Brasil (in billion of
US$) and the net (purchases minus sales) foreign exchange transactions by ﬁnancial sectors in Brazil (in billion of US$). Based on the Dickey–Fuller tests, the Reais/US$ and the
Selic series are non-stationary; these two are ﬁrst differenced. Standard errors are in parentheses.
 Statistical signiﬁcant at 10% level.
** Statistical signiﬁcant at 5% level.
*** Statistical signiﬁcant at 1% level.
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and government announced on 1 March 2012 that the 6% IOF
tax on foreign loans with maturities up to 2 years, now extended
to those with maturities up to 3 years. On 23 May 2012, the gov-
ernment decided to drop the IOF tax on the purchase of deriva-
tives instruments for exporters, and on 14 June 2012, the
government announced a reduction on ﬁnancial transaction tax
on foreign loans to domestic ﬁrms.
To study whether the announcements were anticipated by
the public, we look at the daily movements of several capital
market indicators, including business surveys of expectation on
Reais/US$ and expectation on Selic rates, as well as the spot for-
eign exchange invention by Banco Central do Brasil (in billion of
US$) and the net (purchases minus sales) foreign exchange
transactions by ﬁnancial sectors in Brazil (in billion of US$).
We collected the data from DataStream, which make available
these daily series from 4 May 2009; we are thus able to study
11 out of the 13 dates abovementioned. Appendix Fig. B1 plots
the four series, marked with the 11 announcement dates. As
shown, it appears the announcements were not forecasted by
these market indicators. There are some possibilities nonethe-
less: on one occasion for an increase in the capital control mea-
sure announced on 20 October 2009, when it was preceded by a
signiﬁcant intervention in spot foreign exchange markets by the
central bank on 8 October 2009; and on several occasions when
there were seemingly correlations between net foreign exchange
transactions by the ﬁnancial sector and the decreases of capital
control measures.
We formally test the relationship between the announcement
dates and the market indicators by using probabilistic regres-
sions. Based on the Dickey–Fuller tests, we ﬁnd that the Reais/
US$ and the Selic series are non-stationary; these two are then
ﬁrst differenced. As a ﬁrst pass, we estimate a Probit model of
announcement dates on the four variables contemporaneously.
Columns (1) and (2) of Appendix Table B1 report the estimation
results for the six increases and the ﬁve decreases of the control
announcement dates, respectively. We ﬁnd the central bank’s
intervention is positively associated with the increase announce-
ments, while the Reais’ depreciation is positively associated with
the decrease announcements. However, the explanatory power
of both Probit regressions, as measured by the Pseudo R2, is very
low. Next, we proceed with a Bivariate Probit regression, where-
by the increase announcement is a function of Selic rate, central
bank intervention, and net (purchases minus sales) foreign ex-
change transactions by the ﬁnancial sector; and the decrease
announcement is a function of Reais/US$, Selic rate, and net for-
eign exchange transactions by the ﬁnancial sector, and both
functions are estimated simultaneously. To account for any
lagged effects of these market indicators, we also include their
lags up to 3 days preceding the announcement dates. The esti-
mation results in column (3) of the table suggest that any asso-
ciation between the announcement dates and the market
indicators is rather weak and not statistically signiﬁcant. Neither
the increase nor the decrease announcements signify any statis-
tical relationship with the capital market indicators, all of which
are publicly available. Therefore, we conclude that these policy
changes were not anticipated in any rigorous (actionable) way
by market participants for the episodes of capital control mea-
sures that we are focusing on.
Appendix C. The correlation between EPFR and BOP data
This table reports the correlation coefﬁcients between EPFR mutual fund ﬂows (EPFR) and three ofﬁcial measures of cross-border capital
ﬂows reported by IMF Balance of Payments Statistics (BOP), namely the net portfolio investment (PI), the net equity component of the port-
folio investment (EPI) and the foreign direct investment (FDI). The sample period is from 2007 Q4 to 2011 Q1.
Country qPI,EPFR qEPI,EPFR qFDI,EPFR Country qPI,EPFR qEPI,EPFR qFDI,EPFR
Australia 0.174 0.053 0.174 Malaysia 0.585* 0.454 0.317
Austria 0.076 0.211 0.428 Mexico 0.263 0.194
Belgium 0.401 0.150 0.367 Netherlands 0.304 0.173 0.155
Brazil 0.245 0.478 0.140 New Zealand 0.566 0.169 0.350
Canada 0.196 0.167 0.210 Norway 0.217 0.192 0.104
Chile 0.211 0.121 0.162 Philippines 0.543* 0.509 0.174
China 0.086 0.032 0.249 Poland 0.231 0.065 0.632
Colombia 0.104 0.900*** Portugal 0.157 0.179 0.874*
Czech Republic 0.121 0.031 0.675** Russia 0.563* 0.601* 0.032
Denmark 0.376 0.355 0.537 Singapore 0.263 0.139
Egypt 0.379 South Africa 0.055 0.058 0.050
Finland 0.743 0.564 0.479 South Korea 0.173 0.167 0.181
France 0.023 0.059 0.044 Spain 0.018 0.036 0.261
Germany 0.399 0.033 0.139 Sweden 0.078 0.457 0.260
Greece 0.169 0.040 0.120 Switzerland 0.272 0.171 0.353
Hong Kong 0.086 0.086 0.115 Taiwan 0.005 0.299
India 0.731** 0.652 0.006 Thailand 0.022 0.076 0.283
Indonesia 0.163 0.838*** 0.044 Turkey 0.081 0.149
Israel 0.037 0.080 0.552* United Kingdom 0.284 0.287 0.009
Italy 0.058 0.505 0.502 United States 0.000 0.004 0.338
Japan 0.242 0.460 0.239 Vietnam 0.228 0.172
Data Source: IMF Balance of Payments Statistics (BOP), Central Bank of the Republic of China (Taiwan) and Central Bank of Egypt.
* Statistical signiﬁcant at 10% level.
** Statistical signiﬁcant at 5% level.
*** Statistical signiﬁcant at 1% level.
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Appendix D. Country weights for synthetic capital ﬂows to Brazil
For each episode of capital control, we study 12 weeks (approximately one quarter) before and after the week of its implementation. A
country is included as a possible component of the control group if, for the given 25-week sample period, it did not introduce any capital
controls and it had no missing observations for the selected control variables, namely mutual fund return, TNA, weekly return on stock
market index, weekly return on bond market index and weekly return on foreign exchange rate.
2008-3-12: Taxing ﬁxed income investment.
Country Weight Country Weight Country Weight
Australia 0.119 Indonesia 0.000 South Africa 0.000
Austria 0.000 Israel 0.000 South Korea 0.000
Belgium 0.000 Italy 0.000 Spain 0.000
Canada 0.000 Japan 0.000 Sweden 0.000
Chile 0.051 Malaysia 0.000 Switzerland 0.000
China 0.000 Mexico 0.000 Taiwan 0.496
Czech Republic 0.000 Netherlands 0.000 Thailand 0.000
Egypt 0.000 Norway 0.000 Turkey 0.000
France 0.000 Philippines 0.000 United Kingdom 0.326
Hong Kong 0.000 Russia 0.000 United States 0.009
India 0.000 Singapore 0.000 Vietnam 0.000
2008-10-23: Cutting ﬁxed income tax.
Country Weight Country Weight Country Weight
Australia 0.000 Indonesia 0.000 South Africa 0.000
Austria 0.000 Israel 0.000 South Korea 0.000
Belgium 0.000 Italy 0.000 Spain 0.000
Canada 0.000 Japan 0.000 Sweden 0.000
Chile 0.000 Malaysia 0.000 Switzerland 0.000
China 0.000 Mexico 0.140 Taiwan 0.294
Czech Republic 0.000 Netherlands 0.000 Thailand 0.000
Egypt 0.000 New Zealand 0.000 Turkey 0.000
France 0.000 Norway 0.000 United Kingdom 0.000
Germany 0.000 Philippines 0.000 United States 0.000
Greece 0.000 Portugal 0.000 Vietnam 0.000
Hong Kong 0.000 Russia 0.244
India 0.322 Singapore 0.000
2009-10-20: Taxing stock and bond investment at 2%.
Country Weight Country Weight Country Weight
Australia 0.097 Greece 0.000 Russia 0.456
Austria 0.000 Hong Kong 0.000 Singapore 0.000
Belgium 0.000 India 0.320 South Africa 0.000
Canada 0.000 Indonesia 0.126 Spain 0.000
Chile 0.000 Israel 0.000 Sweden 0.000
China 0.000 Italy 0.000 Switzerland 0.000
Colombia 0.000 Japan 0.000 Taiwan 0.000
Czech Republic 0.000 Malaysia 0.000 Thailand 0.000
Denmark 0.000 Mexico 0.000 Turkey 0.000
Egypt 0.000 Netherlands 0.000 United Kingdom 0.000
France 0.000 New Zealand 0.000 United States 0.000
Germany 0.000 Norway 0.000 Vietnam 0.000
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